Hofstra Law Review
Volume 40
Issue 1 FORTIETH ANNIVERSARY VOLUME

Article 8

2011

The Crisis Exposed by Pari Passu
Preston M. Torbert

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Torbert, Preston M. (2011) "The Crisis Exposed by Pari Passu," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 40: Iss. 1, Article 8.
Available at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss1/8

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Torbert: The Crisis Exposed by Pari Passu

THE CRISIS EXPOSED BY PARI PASSU
PrestonM Torbert*
To this practitioner, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction' by
Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott describes a "crisis" in the Chinese sense
of a situation that presents a danger and an opportunity. The danger is
that the clients' demands for lower legal fees, the mechanized contractproduction process, and the unwillingness to subsidize research will lead
to offshoring of this contract drafting service in the same way that much
of the American manufacturing capacity has moved abroad. If the
contracts are produced in "three and a half minutes" by rote usage, as the
title suggests, and no innovative thinking is going into producing the
contracts, it would seem that this task is ripe for outsourcing. In fact, law
firms and legal departments are now outsourcing (including offshoring)
more and more of their document preparation to legal-process
outsourcing firms. 2 The logic for outsourcing these contracts seems
unassailable.3 Perhaps the outsourcing will only start with the most
standard documents, and would always involve review by a senior
lawyer in the United States. But it could present a tremendous blow to
young associates and to the future of this-and every other-contract
drafting practice in the United States. How law firms deal with this
challenge will depend on how creative and far-sighted they are. Their
response is a topic for someone else to study. I would like to consider the
opportunity that The Three and a Half Minute Transaction presents for
legal education.

* Senior Counsel, Baker & McKenzie, Chicago; Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago
Law School.
1. MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming 2012) (on file with the Hofstra

Law Review).
2. See Law Firms: A Less Gilded Future, ECONOMIST, May 7, 2011, at 74, 74. If some of
this outsourcing involves American lawyers in the United States, this would lessen the risk to the
American legal profession. Heather Timmons, Where Lawyers Find Work: OutsourcingFinns Are
Welcoming US. Talent, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,2011, at BI.
3. See Law Firms:A Less Gilded Future,supranote 2, at 74.
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If the United States is to prevent the offshoring of substantial
amounts of contract drafting, not just sovereign debt bonds, but the
entire range of contract drafting, the legal profession needs to seriously
upgrade its attention to contract drafting. The Three and a Half Minute
Transactionmakes clear that the "big law" firms are not in a position to
do this. The current income expectations of partners and the demands
for lower legal costs from clients mean that, as a whole, the firms will
not be willing to make the investments necessary to generate significant
innovations to improve contract drafting. That leaves the task to the law
schools.
Currently, law schools are not particularly well prepared for this
challenge. They suffer from an overemphasis on policy making, judicial
lawmaking, and litigation as the central themes of legal education.
Christopher Columbus Langdell's Socratic method and case analysis,
adopted by practically all law schools, 6 focuses attention not on
preparing students to think like practicing lawyers, but to think like law
professors. Most practicing lawyers would probably agree that no legal
discipline is more essential to practice than contracts-the drafting,
negotiation, revision, termination, and analysis of contracts. These
topics, beyond the first year contracts course, would seem to be the most
important part of the legal curriculum in preparing future lawyers for
practice, but they are not. Full-time law faculty members who have
never extensively practiced are not comfortable or competent to teach
the appropriate courses and the task, if given any recognition, is
allocated to part-time adjuncts with low status or to clinical programs
that have other goals. Nevertheless, an opportunity exists for those law
schools that want to seize it.
The opportunity is to create in the law school a laboratory for
creative innovation in contract drafting to fill the void left by the failure
of the law firms to do so. 7 The insights and innovations developed by
such a laboratory would improve the quality of contract drafting, make it
more intellectually challenging, and help to prevent the offshoring of a
product that is currently commoditized. The Three and Half Minute
Transaction points to one prominent example of this failure in the field

4. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note I (manuscript at 181-82).
5. See Preston M. Torbert, Contract Drafting: A Socratic Manifesto, SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7-9) (on file with author). But query whether further
cost-cutting will force all outsourcing to be offshoring.
6. Alan A. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARv. L. REV. 392, 406 (1971).
7. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 165, 171) (discussing the barriers to
innovation in modem law firms).
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of sovereign debt contracts, 8 but the same is true for much contract
drafting.
There would seem to be two essential elements for success in
creating such a laboratory: creating a contract drafting program and
attracting a few wise men to join with existing faculty to teach the
courses. The program could include two courses. One would be a course
to teach students about contract drafting from the perspective of the
canons of contract interpretation. These canons address what is perhaps
the core dilemma of contract drafting and what is arguably the major
cause of litigation over contracts-ambiguity. 9 And the pari passu
clause l° is an excellent example of this dilemma. In most of its iterations,
the language of the clause is so abstract and general that many different
plausible interpretations of it have been made over the last hundred years
and more." Was the purpose and effect to avoid or prevent earmarking,
the imposition of a receivership for a debtor country, haircuts for small
banks, involuntary subordination, or existing or future legislation in the
debtor country? Each of these interpretations was plausible, if not
persuasive, in the historical circumstances in which it was advanced. But
this ambiguity has imposed significant costs as noted by Gulati and
Scott.1 2 If lawyers could better understand the nature of ambiguity and
how to deal with it in contract drafting, they should be able to reduce its
deleterious effects.
Arguably the first step in that process is to gain an understanding of
the canons of contract interpretation that help lawyers and judges to
interpret ambiguous language. The immediate task in this regard is to
correctly understand Karl Llewellyn's attack on the thrust and parry of
the contrasting canons. 13 His goal was to determine how judges arrived
at decisions.' 4 His comments were apropos of that goal. But he never
considered the implications of the canons for drafting, as opposed to
interpreting, legislation and contracts. That should be the first task of a
law school laboratory program on contract drafting.
Consider, for example, one canon-the presumption contra
proferentem. The presumption is a tie-breaker that says that, other things
being equal, an ambiguous provision in a contract will be interpreted
8.

See generally id.

9. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD & GEORGE W. KUNEY,
TECHNIQUES, AND EXERCISES 196-97 (2d ed. 2007).
10. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note I (manuscript at 21).
11. Id. (manuscript at 86-91).

LEGAL DRAFTING:

PROCESS,

12.

See, e.g., id. (manuscript at 157-58).

13.

KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 521-28

(1960).
14.

See generally id.
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against the drafter. 15 In drafting a contract, therefore, it would seem that
a drafter should consider preventing the application of this presumption,
thus giving to the client the benefit, other things being equal, of an even
chance of having the ambiguity interpreted in his or her favor. One
would assume, therefore, that the drafting of every contract would start
with a consideration of this presumption and whether it would be
advisable to insert a provision preventing its application. But in order to
do that, the drafter would have to know the answer to such questions as:
How strongly or strictly is the presumption construed? Under what
conditions? In what types of contracts? Between what types of parties?
Against whom-only against the actual drafter or the party that benefits
from the ambiguous provision? In a negotiated contract, who is the
"drafter"-is it the drafter of the whole contract or the specific
provision? What are the applicable precedents in the jurisdiction of the16
governing law of the contract? Contracts in the EDGAR database
suggest that contra proferentem clause appears very infrequently. This
may be because it was negotiated out, but my experience suggests it is
probably to a large degree because practitioners are not well acquainted
with it. Gulati and Scott have provided information on the application of
some other canons of contract interpretation, such as expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, and the "whole statute" presumption, 17 but there is no
mention of contra proferentem or of any effort to prevent its application
in relation to sovereign debt instruments. Based on this absence and
analogizing from the EDGAR contracts, one might draw the inference
that few, if any, of these instruments contain such a clause. Even if one
accepts Karl Llewellyn's argument that the dueling canons cancel each
other out in every contract or in every sovereign debt instrument, that
still leaves contra proferentem as the tie-breaker. Would it not be
interesting to know what the implications of contra proferentem are-or
could be-for paripassu?

15. Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1105,1121 (2006).
16. EDGAR Database-SEC Filings, GLOBAL SEC. INFO., http://leam.westlawbusiness.
com/features/edgar-database-sec-filings.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2012).
17. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 77 n.129, 101). The authors also mention
two potentially new canons of contract interpretation for standard form contracts: a presumption that
the failure to change a contract means that the existing interpretation is correct and a presumption
that a change to a contract means that the prior version was not clear or not on point. Id. (manuscript
at 97-98). These potential canons could also be included in a law school laboratory program's
research on the canons of contract drafting.
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While some articles have been written about this presumption,"8 as
far as I am aware, there is no systematic analysis for contract drafters of
how this presumption affects contract drafting. The same appears to be
the case for the other presumptions as well. It seems that no one has
done a systematic study of the implications of these presumptions, not
for interpreting legislation, but for drafting contracts. Yet the vast
number of reported cases contain many instances in which courts have
referred to these canons,1 9 which could be used to understand how courts
have applied them and how drafters should draft to exclude them or have
them apply. Research by professors and students as part of a course
could develop materials systematically analyzing the canons that would
be useful not only for the course, but as a laboratory resource for
practitioners as well. Such a course would give the students the tools to
perform two tasks at a very high level: to know how the contract will be
interpreted when one's opponent does not 2° and to begin to gauge the
risk of ambiguity and associated litigation for specific practices in
drafting contracts-an ability contract drafters today generally do not
have.21
A second course in a laboratory program would give the students
the chance to apply what they had learned about the canons to actual
contract samples, such as those assembled by the authors or from the
EDGAR database of contracts reported to the Securities and Exchange
Commission annually. This course would allow the students to consider
how the contracts could have been drafted differently and why they were
not. The study of the pari passu problem would be a good example of
contract analysis. Reading materials could inform the students of the
developments in the last century and beyond that led lenders to fear
earmarking, the imposition of a receivership for a debtor country,
haircuts, involuntary subordination, and existing or future legislation in
the debtor country and then ask them to consider whether the thenexisting pari passu provision covered that risk. After analysis of the
particular developments and implications for the pari passu clause were
discussed, The Three and a Half Minute Transaction could be used as a

18. See, e.g., Boardman, supra note 15; John T. Flynn, The Rule Contra Proferentem in the
Government Contract Interpretation Process, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379 (1980); David Horton,
Flipping The Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431
(2009).
19. See Horton, supra note 18, at 452-56.
20. See GtJLATI & SCoTr, supra note 1 (manuscript at 174-75).
21. Id. (manuscript at 181) ("[L]itigation risk, in its various forms, is thus the core
competency from which lawyers cam derive comparative advantage in designing transactions for
their clients.").
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reading to provide students with an overall picture of these developments
and their implications.
This second course could be taught by a combination of full-time
law faculty, contract practitioners, and litigators. In addition, enrollment
by business school students with real-world experience could be
encouraged. The combination of students armed with a command of the
interpretive presumptions, actual contract samples, and sophisticated
practitioners and theorists to discuss the drafting issues would be an
interactive collaborative process and a great educational experience. The
students could write papers examining how the contracts under review
could have been drafted differently. The materials developed in the
course and related research could be made available to interested law
firms, or published in print, or made available
online. Perhaps the
' 22
pill.
"poison
another
produce
could
laboratory
This proposal for a law school laboratory program does not address
the dilemma of contract stickiness discussed in The Three and a Half
Minute Transaction.23 The factors that promote stickiness in the drafting
of sovereign debt instruments should also prevent the innovations
developed in any law school laboratory course from being implemented
in the practice of sovereign debt instruments. That may be true. I am not
arguing that the proposed laboratory course can necessarily solve the
stickiness issue in sovereign bond instruments. But the issue of the
future of contract drafting is much larger than simply the small
community of lawyers located mainly in New York and London who
draft sovereign debt instruments24-it concerns the everyday work of
most lawyers. So even if the laboratory proposal would not change the
particular practices in the drafting of sovereign debt instruments, it
should have an effect in other fields of contract drafting. And if it does
not, is there another better solution to preventing the commoditization
and offshoring of contract drafting? If so, the profession needs to hear it.
And beyond the danger of outsourcing, is not the substantial
improvement of contract drafting something the academy and the bar
should pursue for its own intrinsic merit?

22. Id. (manuscript at 164).
23. Id. (manuscript at 42-52).
24. Id. (manuscript at 71,72 fig.2, 73 fig.3).
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